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PATRICK W. FLAVIN*
Costa Brava Partnership III v. Telos Corp.:
Striking an Inconsistent Balance in Plaintiff
Shareholder Suits
IN CosTA BRA vA PARTNERSHIP III v. TOS CORP., 1 THE CIRCUIT Court for Baltimore
City considered whether the Telos corporation and its directors could be subject to
personal jurisdiction in the State of Maryland when the corporation's only connec-
tion to the state was that it was incorporated under Maryland law.2 The circuit
court also considered whether Costa Brava's shareholder's claim was precluded by
Maryland's statute of limitations if the partnership had been a shareholder for less
than the statutory period, even though the alleged fraudulent conduct occurred
beyond that period and could be ascertained from the corporation's public
records? Further, the court considered whether a shareholder who brings a claim
of fraudulent conveyance by the corporation and its directors can obtain as a rem-
edy a court-appointed receiver to take charge of the corporation's assets and a
court-mandated dissolution of the corporation.4 The Circuit Court for Baltimore
City held that incorporation in Maryland is sufficient contact to warrant personal
jurisdiction,5 and that Costa Brava's claim was not barred by the statute of limita-
tions even though the alleged fraudulent corporate conduct occurred beyond the
statutory period because that period did not begin to run until Costa Brava had
reason to know of the misconduct.6 The court further held that Costa Brava cannot
obtain as a remedy for alleged fraudulent conveyance a court-appointed receiver.7
In so holding, the circuit court inconsistently provided the plaintiff shareholders
with substantial ability to bring suits against corporations for alleged fraudulent
I.D. Candidate, University of Maryland School of Law, May 2008; B.A., University of Maryland. The
author would especially like to thank the other members of the 2007-08 Executive Board, and Ben Peoples in
particular, for the incredible efforts they put in, above and beyond what was expected of them, to publish this
Issue so quickly without sacrificing quality and accuracy.
1. No. 24-C-05-009296, 2006 WL 1313985 (Md. Cir. Ct. Mar. 30, 2006).
2. Id. at *3. The corporation's principal place of business was Ashburn, Virginia. Id. at *4.
3. Id. at *I.
4. Id. at *5-6.
5. Id. at *4.
6. Id. at *7.
7. Id. at *6.
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conduct' while simultaneously denying an effective remedy to redress the current
alleged fraudulent conduct or, more importantly, to deter the same in the future.'
I. THE CASE
The defendant, Telos Corporation, was a public company incorporated in the State
of Maryland, with its headquarters and principal place of business in Virginia."
Telos had securities offerings that included Class A and Class B Common Stock."
The Exchangeable Redeemable Preferred Stock (ERPS), the shares giving rise to
Costa Brava's claim in this case, was issued by Telos in 1989 and was the only
publicly traded preferred class of stock. 2 Under the ERPS registration statement,
ERPS holders were entitled to semi-annual fixed dividend payments, mandatory
redemption as fixed-termed securities, and in some cases the right to elect "Class
D" directors." As of June 1, 2005, 3,185,586 shares of ERPS were outstanding, with
Costa Brava holding 506,811 of those shares, all of which were purchased by the
partnership between January and June of 2005.1'
In December of 1991, Telos ceased making dividend payments to ERPS share-
holders due to what Telos claimed were "insufficient legally available funds."'" The
outstanding unpaid accrual at the time of the suit brought by Costa Brava totaled
$39.7 million.' 6 Telos, as required under the registration statement, was to begin
redeeming 20 percent of the outstanding ERPS stock in 2005, but had not begun to
do so due to Telos' "legally insufficient funds" claim.' Events occurred between
1995 and 2004 that further added to Telos' inability to pay the required dividends
and comply with the redemption schedule. For example, between 1998 and 2004,
Telos paid cash bonuses to its officers totaling over $4.5 million, even though
throughout this time the company claimed to be insolvent.8 Also, between 2000
and 2004, Telos granted many of these same officers stock options totaling
4,468,000 shares. 9 Further, in 1995, Telos entered into a loan agreement with a 75
percent shareholder of its Class A Stock, Director John Porter.2' The loan agree-
ment extended the loan through 2008 at a 17 percent interest rate when the prime
rate at the time was only 8.8 percent.2'
8. See infra Part IV.B.
9. See infra Part IV.C.
10. Costa Brava P'ship, 2006 WL 1313985, at *1.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. id.
17. Id.
18. Id. at *2.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
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After purchasing ERPS stock in January 2005, the plaintiff soon realized that the
defendant corporation was not complying with the dividend payments and re-
demption schedule set forth in the registration statement.22 In March 2005, the
plaintiff notified the defendant corporation of its concern. 23 In reaction the defen-
dant Telos formed an independent committee to investigate ways to rectify the cor-
poration's capital structure insolvency and to finance the scheduled ERPS
redemption.24 In response to the independent committee's letter, Costa Brava se-
cured alternative financing plans, but Telos did not respond to the partnership's
suggestions. 21 Instead, Telos decided to reclassify the ERPS in its 2005 Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) filings as a long-term liability, and to exchange the
ERPS for exchange debentures instead of following the mandatory redemption
schedule.26
In September of 2005, Costa Brava made demand on the Telos Corporation for
full accounting of Telos' bonus payments. 7 The partnership demanded that Telos
recover bonus payments paid to the officers beginning in 1998, and that Telos de-
vise a payment plan for the ERPS dividends.2" Having heard no response to its
demand, Costa Brava filed suit in October 2005.29 The partnership sought to estab-
lish jurisdiction over Telos3" in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City' to have the
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. Costa Brava's assertion of personal jurisdiction over one of the directors, Director Stewart, was
dismissed because Stewart was not a director when the first demand letter was made and because Stewart was
named to Telos' Board of Directors only twelve days before the partnership filed its complaint. Id. at *2-3.
Costa Brava argued that Stewart should not be dismissed because he also failed to address the partnership's
initial demand on the corporation, and in so doing he breached the fiduciary duty he owed to the corporation.
Id. The court granted Stewart's motion to dismiss because he was not a member of Telos' board at the time
when the alleged fraudulent conduct occurred and he had no firsthand knowledge of the events that occurred.
Id. The court had an opportunity to address in more detail a fairly significant legal issue-to what extent a
director can be held liable for conduct of the corporation that occurred before that person became a director or
even simultaneously with their arrival. By not allowing the issue to proceed beyond Stewart's motion to dis-
miss, the court overlooked important factual events, such as Stewart's possible interaction with the corporation
and possible knowledge of the corporation's financial status before actually becoming a director, that may have
made Stewart a proper defendant in this case. Though it may seem unfair to hold Stewart potentially liable
when he was only on the board for twelve days, directors in other contexts have otherwise been held liable. See
Escott v. BarChris Constr. Co., 283 F. Supp. 643, 688 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) ("Section 11 imposes liability in the first
instance upon a director, no matter how new he is. He is presumed to know his responsibility when he be-
comes a director.").
31. Costa Brava P'ship, 2006 WL 1313985, at *3, *5. Telos raised the jurisdictional defense of forum non
conveniens for being subjected to litigation in Baltimore City. Id. at *3. Under the Maryland Code, "[ijfa court
finds that in the interest of substantial justice an action should be heard in another forum, the court may stay
or dismiss the action in whole or in part on any conditions it considers just." MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD.
PROC. § 6-104 (LexisNexis 2006). Under Jones v. Prince George's County, in making this determination the
court is to "balance the convenience of witnesses and those public-interest factors of systemic integrity and
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court appoint a receiver to take over Telos' assets and management and devise a
plan to pay off Telos' debts. 2
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Asserting Personal Jurisdiction in Maryland over Corporations and their
Directors Based Solely on the Corporation's State of Incorporation
To determine whether a court can exercise personal jurisdiction over a non-resi-
dent defendant in Maryland, it must first be determined "whether jurisdiction is
established under Maryland's long-arm statute," and, if so, then it must be deter-
mined "whether the exercise of jurisdiction comports with the Fourteenth Amend-
ment Due Process Clause."" Maryland's long-arm statute has been interpreted,
however, to extend to the fullest limits of the Fourteenth Amendment, so that the
statutory inquiry merges with the constitutional examination. 4 Therefore, in
Maryland the reach of the long-arm statute depends largely upon whether in per-
sonam jurisdiction may be asserted and maintained under the Fourteenth
Amendment. 5
The United States Supreme Court has established that the Due Process Clause
imposes many fundamental limits on exercising personal jurisdiction over out-of-
state defendants. 6 In order for there to be jurisdiction consistent with due process,
a non-resident defendant must have sufficient minimum contacts with the forum
fairness .... " 835 A.2d 632, 645-46 (Md. 2003) (citing Leung v. Nunes, 729 A.2d 956 (Md. 1999)). The court
found that because Telos was incorporated in Maryland, it had agreed to subject itself to jurisdiction. See infra
Part III.A. More specifically, the court also found that given the geographic proximity of Telos' headquarters in
Ashburn, Virginia, to Baltimore, Maryland, Telos was not materially inconvenienced such that the case should
be heard in another forum. Costa Brava P'ship, 2006 WL 1313985, at *3.
32. Costa Brava P'ship, 2006 WL 1313985, at *5-6. Costa Brava also sought to join the directors, officers,
and the corporation as defendants, to hold the interested directors and officers personally liable, and to hold
the corporation derivatively liable as a shareholder. Id. at *5-9. With respect to the partnership's direct claim
against the corporation, the court cited Bennett Heating & Air Conditioning, Inc. v. Nations Bank, 654 A.2d 949
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1995), rev'd in part on other grounds, 674 A.2d 534 (Md. 1996) (holding that a court must
assume the truth of all relevant material facts that are well-pleaded and all inferences that can be reasonably
drawn from the pleadings). Id. at *3. Drawing all reasonable inferences from the plaintiffs alleged facts, the
court denied Telos' motion to dismiss the direct claims against both the corporation and its directors and
officers. Id. at *4, *8. With regards to the partnership's derivative claims, the issue that arose was whether Costa
Brava had given Telos sufficient time in which to respond to pre-suit demand before bringing suit. Id. at *8.
Section 7.42 of the Model Business Corporation Act states that ninety days is an appropriate period in which to
respond to pre-suit demand, while section 7.03(d) of the American Law Institute's Principles of Corporate
Governance states that thirty days is an appropriate period. Id. The court declined to adopt either specific
period as the appropriate time period, and instead adopted a totality of the circumstances approach in this
case. Id. The court found that Costa Brava had made demand sufficiently prior to bringing suit, and that Telos
had failed to respond to the original demand. Id. So regardless of the timing of the second demand, Costa
Brava had given Telos an appropriate amount of time under either guideline to respond. Id.
33. McGann v. Wilson, 701 A.2d 873, 876 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1997) (citing Bahn v. Chi. Motor Club Ins.
Co., 634 A.2d 63 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1993)).
34. Beyond Sys., Inc. v. Realtime Gaming Holding Co., 878 A.2d 567, 580 (Md. 2005).
35. Bond v. Messerman, 895 A.2d 990, 999-1000 (Md. 2006).
36. Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 311-22 (1945).
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state such that "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice" are not of-
fended. 7 Also, the defendant's contacts with the state must be sufficient enough
that he could "reasonably anticipate being haled into court" there."
In Pittsburgh Terminal Corp. v. Mid Allegheny Corp.,39 the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, applying the constitutional framework set forth by
the Supreme Court, addressed the issue of whether mere acceptance of a director-
ship in a corporation of the forum state constitutes minimum contacts.4" The di-
rectors being sued by the plaintiffs in Pittsburgh Terminal were residents of the
State of Virginia and their principal place of employment was in Richmond.4' The
directors were being sued in West Virginia, and the connection the plaintiffs alleged
as a basis for in personam jurisdiction in the state was that the defendants had
recently become directors of a West Virginia corporation whose principal place of
business was in West Virginia. 2 Despite the court finding that "[n]either of the
non-resident directors was ever physically present in West Virginia, '4 3 the court
held that the defendants' acceptance of directorships in a West Virginia corporation
established sufficient minimum contacts to subject the defendants to personal ju-
risdiction there. 4 The Court of Appeals reasoned that because directors reap the
advantages and protections available to them under the forum state's law, it is not
unfair to require them to answer for any alleged misconduct in or affecting the
forum state. Thus, being a director of a corporation incorporated in the forum
state is sufficient to subject the director to personal jurisdiction.
37. Id. at 316 (citing Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 547 (1940)).
38. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980).
39. 831 F.2d 522 (4th Cir. 1987).
40. Id. at 525.
41. Id. at 524.
42. Id. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit specifically found that the two directors being sued,
Directors Hawk and Griffith, had
at least the following contacts with the State of West Virginia: (1) they acted as directors of a West
Virginia corporation [Mid Allegheny Corp.] which did business in West Virginia, (2) as directors of
Western Maryland [Western Maryland is a Maryland corporation doing business in Maryland and
West Virginia], they participated in the solicitation of the proxy of Mid Allegheny in favor of the
merger, (3) as the directors of Mid Allegheny, they participated in voting the corporation's stock in
favor of the challenged transaction, and (4) they approved the transaction through a telephone call to
West Virginia with Mid Allegheny's director and president, a citizen of West Virginia.
Id. It is not clear from the court's opinion whether these facts were argued or alleged by the plaintiffs or
whether the court was assuming these facts based on Hawk and Griffith's acceptance of their directorships. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 529.
45. See id. ("Certainly, a director of a corporation has created a continuing obligation between himself and
the corporation, one which inures significantly to the director's benefit, not to mention that of the corporation.
Directors reap the advantages and protections available to them under state law, and it is not unfair to require
them to answer for any alleged breaches of trust as a director in the forum that has bestowed those protections.
No one forced or tricked the defendants into assuming their positions, and it seems clear that Hawk and
Griffith have purposefully availed themselves of the privilege of doing business as directors under West Vir-
ginia's laws.").
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B. Running of Maryland's Statute of Limitations for Civil Causes of Action
Under the Maryland Code, there is a general three-year limitation on civil law-
suits.46 The statute specifically states that "[a] civil action at law shall be filed within
three years from the date it accrues unless another provision of the Code provides a
different period of time within which an action shall be commenced."47 In Pof-
fenberger v. Risser,4" the Maryland Court of Appeals held that the point at which a
civil action "accrues" is based on the discovery rule, meaning that the cause of
action accrues when the claimant in fact knew or reasonably should have known of
the wrong.49 The Court of Appeals noted in this holding that the general rule up to
this point had been that the running of the limitations against a right or cause of
action is triggered upon occurrence of the alleged wrong, and not when it is discov-
ered, so the court adopted the new standard to alleviate the harshness and unfair-
ness the former standard placed upon plaintiffs. 0
The Court of Appeals had previously, in Herring v. Offutt,5" addressed situations
in which the plaintiff was unable to discover the defendant's misconduct because of
the defendant's attempts to conceal the misconduct. 2 In Herring, the Court of Ap-
peals held that in all actions where a party has been kept in ignorance of their cause
of action "by the fraud of the adverse party, the right to bring suit shall be deemed
to have first accrued at the time at which such fraud shall or with usual or ordinary
diligence might have been known or discovered." 3 In this ruling, however, the
court noted that "the running of the Statute of Limitations will not be postponed if
the defrauded person may discover the fraud from the public records," but that
such a rule "does not apply to a person while a fiduciary relationship exists and
where nothing occurred to indicate the necessity for investigation."54 Thus, in the
46. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 5-101 (LexisNexis 2006).
47. Id.
48. 431 A.2d 677 (Md. 1981).
49. Id. at 680.
50. Id. at 679.
51. 295 A.2d 876 (Md. 1972).
52. Id. at 880.
53. Id. at 881 (citing MD. ANN. CODE art. 57, § 14 (1957)).
54. Id. at 881. The Court stated here
[wjhere a confidential relationship exists between the parties, failure to discover the facts constituting
fraud may be excused. In such a case, so long as the relationship continues unrepudiated, there is
nothing to put the injured party on inquiry, and he cannot be said to have failed to use due diligence
in detecting the fraud. This is for the reason that a confidential relationship by its nature gives the
confiding party the right to relax his vigilance to a certain extent and rely on the good faith of the
other party and his duty to disclose all material facts, and therefore the confiding party has no duty
to make inquiries until something occurs to make him suspicious.
Id. at 880-81 (quoting Vail v. Vail, 63 S.E.2d 202 (N.C. 1951)). Costa Brava could have made the argument
that they were engaged, as shareholders, in a confidential relationship with the directors, whom they were
suing, and the corporation, to try to avoid the running of the statute of limitations. However, since the alleged
misconduct in the partnership's claim could still have been ascertained from Telos' SEC filings, the confidential
relationship argument would probably have been moot since the information was nevertheless publicly avala-
ble. See infra Part IV.B. Perhaps Costa Brava could then have raised the issue that as minority shareholders of
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corporate context, shareholders generally have notice as a matter of law regarding
any information contained in public records, including SEC filings, because such
information is public and accessible."5 Therefore, the statute of limitations begins to
run on shareholders if the corporate misconduct could be ascertained from public
records. 6
C. Maryland Law Protects Creditors against Bad Faith Debtors by Providing a
Cause of Action for Fraudulent Conveyances
Under Maryland law, "[e]very conveyance made and every obligation incurred by a
person who is or will be rendered insolvent by it is fraudulent as to creditors with-
out regard to his actual intent, if the conveyance is made or the obligation is in-
curred without a fair consideration.""7 In addition, "[e]very conveyance made and
every obligation incurred without fair consideration when the person who makes
the conveyance or who enters into the obligation intends or believes that he will
incur debts beyond his ability to pay as they mature, is fraudulent as to both pre-
sent and future creditors."" Such a claim of fraudulent conveyance can arise from
misconduct or negligent action on the part of a corporation or business.5 9 Mary-
land law further provides that "[i]f a conveyance made or obligation incurred is
fraudulent as to a creditor whose claim has not matured, he may proceed in a court
of competent jurisdiction against any person against whom he could have pro-
preferred stock with limited voting rights, the partners were truly dependent upon the good faith (i.e. fiduciary
duties) of the directors because in practice they had no say over who the directors of the corporation were.
Costa Brava thus could have asserted that a confidential relationship existed between the plaintiff shareholders
and the directors because of this dependence.
55. See Raab v. Gen. Physics Corp., 4 F.3d 286, 289 (4th Cir. 1993) ("Omitting the contract slowdown
from the Annual Report is not actionable because the contemporaneous press release of March 30, 1992 in-
formed the market of a slowdown in DOE contracting awards. Plaintiffs rely on fraud on the market to estab-
lish reliance in this case; unfortunately for them, the presumption that the market price has internalized all
publicly available information cuts both ways. The information available to the market included not only the
Annual Report, but also the March 30 press release. 'In a fraud on the market case, the defendant's failure to
disclose material information may be excused where that information has been made credibly available to the
market by other sources."') (quoting In re Apple Computer Sec. Litig., 886 F.2d 1109 (9th Cir. 1989)).
56. Id.
57. MD. CODE ANN., CoM. LAW § 15-204 (LexisNexis 2006) (emphasis added).
58. Id. § 206.
59. See F. S. Bowen Elec. Co. v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 256 F.2d 46, 49-50 (4th Cir. 1958) ("While the
Bowen company denies that it was the transferee of the disputed items, the record is quite sufficient to support
the finding of the District Judge that it was. One of the items, a check for $20,100 was made payable to F. S.
Bowen, the controlling, or sole, stockholder of the Bowen company, and was immediately endorsed by him and
deposited to the credit of the Bowen company. The fact that, on the books of the company, it was entered as a
credit to the personal account of Mr. and Mrs. Bowen does not give the company the status of a bona fide
purchaser. If it was not intended, from the outset, to be the recipient of the funds, it did receive them and it
took them charged with knowledge of all of the circumstances."). The plaintiffs in the present case could have
analogized from this case to argue that the directors and officers who were accepting large bonuses, even
though the corporation was reporting as insolvent, accepted the money with knowledge of all of the circum-
stances, and as such the conveyance of the bonuses was fraudulent.
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ceeded had his claim matured."' In this proceeding the court can, among other
remedies, set aside the conveyance or appoint a receiver to take charge of the
property."
Maryland law only provides for a claim of fraudulent conveyance to persons or
entities recognized as creditors of any debt assumed. 2 A relationship of creditor/
debtor with regards to shareholders and their relationship to the corporation can
only arise under certain circumstances, as recognized by the Maryland Court of
Appeals in Heyn v. Fidelity Trust Co.6" In this case, the court stated that "there is no
relation of debtor and creditor between the corporation and preferred stockholders
or cumulative preferred stockholders until the declaration of the dividend, when, in
consequence of the declaration, the obligation of debtor and creditor does arise."64
As a remedy for a fraudulent conveyance, under certain pressing circumstances
Maryland law provides for a court-appointed receiver of the property to take
charge of the assets and control their eventual distribution.65 This remedy, however,
is seldom (if ever) used because Maryland courts are reluctant to exercise such
broad authority unless the plaintiffs can overcome the substantial burden of prov-
ing both imminent necessity and the lack of an adequate alternative remedy.66
III. THE COURT'S REASONING
A. Personal Jurisdiction in Maryland can be Asserted over a Corporation and its
Directors Based Solely on the Corporation Incorporating in Maryland
In Costa Brava, the Circuit Court for Baltimore City held that Telos' directors and
the corporation were subject to personal jurisdiction in Maryland.67 The circuit
60. MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAw § 15-210.
61. Id.
62. See supra notes 57, 58, 60 and accompanying texts.
63. 197 A. 292 (Md. 1938).
64. Id. at 296.
65. Blondheim v. Moore, 11 Md. 365, 374 (1857). The extreme circumstances, as cited by the Maryland
Court of Appeals, include:
1st. That the power of appointment is a delicate one, and to be exercised with great circumspection.
2nd. That it must appear the claimant has a title to the property, and the court must be satisfied by
affidavit, that a receiver is necessary to preserve the property. 3rd. That there is no case in which the
court appoints a receiver merely because the measure can do no harm. 4th. That "fraud or imminent
danger, if the intermediate possession should not be taken by the court, must be clearly proved;" and
5thly. That unless the necessity be of the most stringent character, the court will not appoint until the
defendant is first heard in response to the application.
Id.
66. See Baker v. Baker, 70 A. 418, 420 (Md. 1908) ("In the leading, and well known, case of Blondheim v.
Moore, 11 Md. 365, CHIEF JUDGE LEGRAND announced certain rules for the government of Courts in
appointing receivers, which have often since been repeated and followed. After saying that the power of ap-
pointment must be exercised with great circumspection, that it must appear the claimant has a title to the
property and the Court must be satisfied by affidavit that a receiver is necessary to preserve it, that in no case
should the Court make an appointment merely because it could do no harm . . ").
67. Costa Brava P'ship III v. Telos Corp., No. 24-C-05-009296, 2006 WL 1313985, at *3-4 (Md. Cir. Ct.
Mar. 30, 2006).
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court adopted the reasoning of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit in Pittsburgh Terminal Corp., finding that because Telos was incorporated
under Maryland law, "[a]ny action taken by the Directors and Officers with respect
to the management of Telos can only be given effect in Maryland by virtue of
Maryland law."68 Therefore, the defendant transacted business in Maryland
through the alleged fraudulent transfers of bonuses and stock options and the deci-
sions of whether to pay the expected dividends.69 Because Maryland's long-arm
statute extends to the fullest extent allowed under the Due Process Clause, the court
held that this "transacting business" in Maryland amounted to sufficient contacts
with and purposeful availment of the laws of Maryland to thereby subject the de-
fendants to personal jurisdiction.7"
B. The Statute of Limitations in Maryland does not Run against Plaintiff
Shareholders who cannot Demand the Payment of Dividends
The circuit court also held that Costa Brava's claims were not barred by the three
year statute of limitations.7' The court found that pursuant to the discovery rule,
Costa Brava's claim for fraudulent conveyance could not have accrued until the
partnership knew or had reason to know that Telos did not intend, in good faith, to
make efforts to adhere to the ERPS redemption schedule or to pay the expected
dividends.7 2 Costa Brava, according to the court, did not have reason to know that
Telos was insolvent and was not going to fulfill its obligations under the ERPS
registration statement until Telos formed the independent committee to review its
own financial status.73 Before the formation of the committee and throughout the
period in which Telos failed to adhere to its obligations, the partners had no right
to demand the payment of ERPS dividends because the dividend payments were to
be paid at the discretion of Telos' directors.74 Thus, the partners did not have notice
of Telos' insolvency until it became clear, within the last two years, that the corpo-
ration was financially unable to fulfill its mandatory obligations.75 Therefore, the
plaintiffs' claim accrued within the statute of limitations.76
68. Id. at *4.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at '7.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
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C. The Claim of Fraudulent Conveyance only Protects Creditors under Maryland
Law and only Provides for a Receiver of the Property Subject to the
Conveyance Itself
The circuit court further held that Costa Brava could not assert a claim of fraudu-
lent conveyance because the partnership is not a creditor for the purposes of Mary-
land law." In addressing this part of Costa Brava's claim, the court at first
attempted to classify the attributes of the plaintiff's ERPS stock as equity, rather
than debt, by highlighting how ERPS holders retained part ownership in Telos,
maintained the right to vote, were entitled to dividend payments but had no right
to have a dividend declared, and had a right to a pro rata distribution of any re-
maining assets in the case of a solvent dissolution of Telos.7s The court concluded
that, although it is doubtful that the plaintiff could be considered a creditor under
the authority of Heyn, the plaintiff was entitled to further discovery on this issue.79
However, in considering the remedies available to Costa Brava for this claim, the
court held that the remedy of a court-appointed receiver of a corporation is not
authorized under Maryland law. 0 The court reached this holding by asserting that
"given the plain meaning of Md. Code Ann., Comm. Law § 15-210, and the ab-
sence of case law interpreting said section, the Court is convinced that Maryland
law does not provide for the appointment of a receiver for Telos as a remedy for a
fraudulent conveyance claim.""'
IV. ANALYSIS
A. The Circuit Court Properly Forced the Defendants to be Accountable in
Maryland by Holding that Incorporating in Maryland is Sufficient for
Personal Jurisdiction
By adopting the broad minimum standard of personal jurisdiction set forth in the
Fourth Circuit's opinion in Pittsburgh Terminal, the Circuit Court for Baltimore
City adequately provided the plaintiff Costa Brava, and potential future plaintiffs,
with the convenience of litigating in their own home state. Providing plaintiffs with
this opportunity is consistent with at least three of the four personal jurisdiction
considerations the Supreme Court set forth in World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v.
77. Id. at *5-6.
78. Id. at *5.
79. Id.
80. Id. at *6.
81. Id. The plain language the court relied upon to deny the appointment of a receiver to take charge of
Telos states that as a remedy for a claim of fraudulent conveyance, the court may "[aippoint a receiver to take
charge of the property." MD. CODE ANN., CoM. LAW § 15-210 (LexisNexis 2006) (emphasis added). By relying
on this language, the court essentially held that this section only allows the appointment of a receiver for the
property that is the subject of the fraudulent transaction. This holding seems to contradict the legislative intent
of the title 15, subtitle 2, section 210 remedies for fraudulent conveyances. See infra note 87 and accompanying
text.
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Woodson, 2 to include "the forum State's interest in adjudicating the dispute," "the
plaintiffs interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief," "the interstate judi-
cial system's interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies,"
and "the shared interest of the several States in furthering fundamental substantive
social policies."83
The circuit court's holding provides adequately for Maryland's interest in adjudi-
cating the dispute. The Telos Corporation opted to incorporate in Maryland, and
despite the fact that the directors were acting outside of the state, their actions have
the greatest legal effect in Maryland. Because Maryland provides the directors and
the corporation with the requisite corporate legal protection and benefits, it is only
fair and reasonable for the directors and corporation to be subject to suit in Mary-
land. Also, because the partners of Costa Brava are citizens of the state, it would be
most convenient and effective for the partners to litigate in Maryland against an-
other Maryland citizen. Further, the interstate judicial system's interest would dic-
tate that this case be litigated in Maryland because Maryland courts should resolve
issues of corporate governance for Maryland corporations to provide as much con-
sistency as possible. Because Telos was incorporated under Maryland law, requiring
the corporation to defend suits in the state puts corporations and their directors on
notice that it is more than a mere formality to incorporate under Maryland law.
Asserting personal jurisdiction thus avoids the inequitable contradiction of provid-
ing protection for corporations and their directors yet not holding them accounta-
ble as corporate actors were they only subject to personal jurisdiction in the state of
the corporation's principal place of business.
B. The Circuit Court Erred by Allowing Plaintiff Shareholders to Overlook
Publicly Available Corporate Information to Avoid the Statute of Limitations
Though the circuit court correctly provided plaintiffs with an important means of
litigating their claims in their own state, the court on the other hand provided
plaintiffs with far too much latitude for avoiding the statute of limitations. In this
case the circuit court erred in siding with Costa Brava's characterization of the
claim against Telos. Costa Brava used its lack of ownership prior to 2005 as a means
to act as though it had no reason to know of Telos' financial insolvency-even
though it was public record that Telos had ceased making dividend payments since
1991.84 Because this information was public and accessible, it should have put both
present and future shareholders on notice that Telos was either engaging in ques-
tionable corporate conduct or potentially insolvent. Even if the exact cause of the
lengthy nonpayment of dividends was not readily apparent, the publicly-available
information should have been considered sufficient enough to put shareholders or
82. 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
83. Id. at 292.
84. See supra Part I.
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potential purchasers on "inquiry notice," requiring them to conduct some mini-
mally reasonable inquiry into Telos' status.8 5
Rather than requiring current and potential shareholders to, at a minimum, in-
quire into the corporation's financial status, the court in effect allowed plaintiffs to
purchase into questionable corporate securities practices and retain actionable
rights. Costa Brava's claims regarding the redemption schedule and unpaid divi-
dends that arose within the three year statute of limitations should have been sus-
tained, but those that occurred beyond the three years should have been dismissed.
In order to avoid allowing plaintiff shareholders to overlook the financial realities
of corporations in which they intend to purchase stock, the court should have held
that unless the shareholder conducts a minimally reasonable investigation, any
claims beyond the statute of limitations should be dismissed.
C. The Circuit Court Erred by Holding that the Appointment of a Receiver is not
an Available Remedy in a Claim for Fraudulent Conveyances Against a
Corporation
After erring on the side of plaintiff shareholders with regards to the statute of limi-
tations issue, the circuit court then performed an about-face and erred on the side
of the corporation with regards to its holding on the fraudulent conveyance claim.
The court correctly found for the first half of this issue that discovery should con-
tinue regarding the issue of whether the plaintiffs could be considered creditors
under Maryland law. The statutory definition of creditor is "a person who has any
claim, whether matured or unmatured, liquidated or unliquidated, absolute, fixed,
or contingent." 6 Though Costa Brava did not seem to allege that Heyn's require-
ment that the corporation have declared dividends was satisfied, the circuit court
85. See Lumsden v. Design Tech Builders, Inc., 749 A.2d 796, 802 (Md. 2000) ("[A] plaintiff is only on
inquiry notice, and thus the statute of limitations will begin to run, when the plaintiff [ I has 'knowledge of
circumstances which would cause a reasonable person in the position of the plaintiff to undertake an investiga-
tion which, if pursued with reasonable diligence, would have led to knowledge of the alleged [action].' [(cita-
tion omitted)] In such a situation, should the plaintiff fail to seek out the facts supporting a cause of action, it
can fairly be said that the plaintiff has inexcusably slept on his rights."). Given that Costa Brava purchased
506,811 shares of the Telos Corporation in a six month time span, the circuit court should have at least
considered whether a reasonable person in the position of the partnership, and making such substantial
purchases, would have researched the corporation's publicly-filed SEC disclosures before buying the shares.
Such an investigation could be considered "minimally reasonable" for a purchaser because of the ease with
which publicly filed disclosures are available. Whether or not such an investigation would provide plaintiffs
with sufficient knowledge to discover possible misconduct would ultimately depend on the facts of each case,
with emphasis on the sophistication of the purchaser and the number of shares purchased. In the present case,
the fact that Costa Brava was a limited partnership that purchased a substantial number of shares in a short
time period suggests that the partnership purchased for investment purposes, indicating that Costa Brava was
potentially a more sophisticated purchaser. A reasonable person in the position of Costa Brava perhaps would
have looked into Telos' financial status before buying and have been able to discover the corporation's poor
financial shape.
86. MD. CoDE ANN., CoM. LAW § 15-201.
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properly denied Telos' motion to dismiss on this part of the claim and allowed for
further discovery to more accurately resolve this issue.
However, the court effectively rendered the issue moot by holding that the ap-
pointment of a receiver for a corporation is not available as a remedy under Mary-
land law, whether or not the claim is successful on the substantive merits.8 7 By so
holding, the court missed an opportunity to extend the reach and authority of
appointments of receivers to cases such as this, where there were allegations of
serious misrepresentations and corporate misconduct, to both curb misleading cor-
porate actions and to provide adequate remedies to shareholders and creditors."8
The plaintiffs sufficiently alleged that Telos engaged in fraudulent conveyances and
that the most appropriate remedy to protect shareholders from losing their shares
to bankruptcy would be a court-appointed receiver. By eliminating a receiver as a
possible remedy, the court closed the door on the most powerful means of checking
corporate abuse available under Maryland law-a court mandated removal of the
corporation's officers and directors and the appointment of a receiver to redistrib-
ute the remaining corporate assets.8 9 The mere possibility of such a remedy would
make many corporations such as Telos reconsider the extent to which they wish to
depart from the duties and responsibilities that they owe shareholders.
87. See supra Part 11.C. The court's holding seems to have contradicted the legislative intent of title 15,
section 210 remedies by relying exclusively on section 2 10(b)(2)'s language providing for the appointment of a
receiver "to take charge of the property." MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 15-210 (emphasis added). For section
210(b)(1) provides that as a remedy the court may"[rlestrain the defendant from disposing of his property." Id.
(emphasis added). The difference in the language is significant, as the latter, which is listed first, indicates an
intent on the part of the legislature to restrain the defendant beyond just the contested transaction. Moreover,
section 210(b)(4) provides that as a remedy the court may "[einter any order which the circumstances of the
case require." Id. Granting such broad authority to the courts indicates a further intent to provide the courts
with the full gamut of remedies necessary to cure the wrong done, and even yet to be done, to the plaintiff.
Given that the court relied on the plain language of one section alone and even cited the absence of case law
interpreting title 15, subtitle 2, section 210 as the basis for its holding, the court failed to adequately fulfill the
legislature's intent in providing the necessary remedies for plaintiffs in fraudulent conveyance claims under title
15, subtitle 2, section 210.
88. See Knighton v. Young, 22 Md. 359, 372 (1864) ("[W]e think there is nothing in the bill to require the
issuing of an injunction or appointment of a receiver. . . .There is no allegation that the rents, issues and
profits of the real estate supposed to be subject to dower, will be lost irretrievably, by reason of the insolvency of
those receiving them, or that the complainant has not adequate remedy at law, for such of the rents as he may
be entitled to: it is not sufficient to allege they are in jeopardy, but it must be shown how they are jeopard-
ized.") (emphasis added). The court should have allowed the plaintiffs to try to assert on the merits that,
because Telos had been put into insolvency, the shareholders' interests would be irretrievably lost without the
remedy of a court-appointed receiver to redress the corporation's financial troubles. The plaintiffs could also
have asserted that appointing a receiver as an independent outside check on the corporation's financial deci-
sions would furnish the only adequate remedy at law to protect their interests.
89. See supra notes 65, 66 and accompanying texts. The plaintiffs were seeking a redistribution of the
corporation's remaining assets in one of two ways-either the appointment of a receiver to take charge of the
company's assets and actually operate the corporation, or the appointment of a receiver to manage the judi-
cially granted dissolution of the corporation. Costa Brava P'ship III v. Telos Corp., No. 24-C-05-009296, 2006
WL 1313985, at *1 (Md. Cir. Ct. Mar. 30, 2006).
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V. CONCLUSION
In Costa Brava,' the Circuit Court for Baltimore City struck an inconsistent bal-
ance on important issues relating to corporations and shareholder suits. The court
correctly found that corporations are to be subject to personal jurisdiction in the
state under which they are incorporated. However, the court erred on the side of
shareholders in holding that plaintiffs can successfully plead lack of notice of cor-
porate misconduct up until they bring suit and make demand on the board. Con-
versely, the court erred on the side of corporations in holding that the appointment
of a receiver is not an available remedy for a shareholders' fraudulent conveyance
claim against the corporation. In so ruling, the circuit court in one instance too
freely broadened shareholders' access to seek the usual available remedies despite
accessible public records, yet in the other instance eliminated the bite of that access
for shareholders and others in the very few cases where it is the effective and pow-
erful remedy, rather than the access, that is far more needed.
90. No. 24-C-05-009296, 2006 WL 1313985.
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